Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 46 | Issue 4

Article 9

6-1-1971

Book Reviews
Henry B. Rothblatt
Samuel R. Pierce
Charles E. Rice
Rush H. Limbaugh

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Henry B. Rothblatt, Samuel R. Pierce, Charles E. Rice & Rush H. Limbaugh, Book Reviews, 46 Notre Dame L. Rev. 835 (1971).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol46/iss4/9

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

BOOK REVIEWS
By S. Sidney Ulmer. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. 1970. Pp. .112.

MILITARY JUSTICE, AmI THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL.

A good book is a happy coincidence of form and content. Horace wrote that
an author succeeds when he "has mingled profit with pleasure." But as with
most books, Military Justice and the Right to Counsel is a failure in.this regard;
the author's style is inappropriate to his subject matter, the book is tedious, and
we gain very little from it. it is an occasionally interesting book which fails
because it is pretentious, contrived,, and occasionally inaccurate.
The most inappropriate part of the book is the twelve-page introduction, in
which the author attempts to tie in his subject matter with the Pueblo incident.
On the face of it, this is difficult. There have been many noteworthy military
cases during the past decade in which the right to counsel was at issue; it was,
however, never at issue during the hearings pursuant to the Pueblo.matter. The
author attempts to justify his discussion of the Pueblo by telling us that "the
present study examines the development of American militaryy justice in the
context of military prosecutions and the interplay of politics and the public with
that development." 2 Certainly there are other cases more appropriate to this
issue.,
I suppose my main objection to the use of the Pueblo incident in an introduction to a book called Military Justice and the Right to Counsel is that it is
symptomatic of a trend in contemporary literature-the attempt to be "relevant"
even at the expense of total irrelevance. Often the author tries to assurehis
reader that his work really does reflect the current headlines, even though the
news story he uses has nothing to do with the subject matter of the book.
The introduction also contains some inaccuracies. For instance, the author
tells us that "Article 92 of the Uniform, Code forbids dereliction in the performance of duties and sets as a penalty such, punishment as a court-martial may
direct."' The implication of this statement seems to be that such an offense carries with it grave and terrible punishment. In fact, the maximum punishment
for such an offense is confinement at hard labor not to exceed three months, and
forfeiture of 2/3 pay for three months.5 There is no provision for punitive discharge.
More troublesome is the statement that "A court of inquiry is.neither a
court-martial nor a trial."6 This would seem to indicate a distinction between
"court-martial" and "trial." The mistake is not grammatical. At other places in
the book the author tells us that "The military defendant has no right to trial by

1 "He has carried every point who has mingled profit with pleasure."
POETICA, line 23.
2

S. ULMER, MILITARY JUSTICE AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL

HORACE, ARs

12 (1970).

3 See, e.g., Rothblatt, Military Justice or Injustice:' The Green Beret Case, 75 CASE &
COMMENT 3 (July-Aug., 1970).
4

S. ULMER, supra note 2, at 9.

5
6

Table of Maximum Punishments, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 25-12 (1969).
S. ULMER, supra note 2, at 7.
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jury," and-that the military man "knows that he has no right to jury trial.""
Now, as a matter of fact, a court-martial is very much a trial, and the military court selected is very much a jury. Although the presiding legal authority,
the military judge, is the finder of law, it is the court that is the finder of fact.
Much has been written on the proper use of voir dire in the selection of a
military court,9 but the techniques used by defense counsel are largely the same as
those used in a trial before any other jury. 0 For the defense of crimes of violence,
most experienced counsel would prefer trial before a military court to trial before
any other kind of jury.
Perhaps this sort of criticism is unfair, since this book is obviously not written
for the practicing attorney. But any author is always inaccurate insofar as he is
impractical.
Any practicing attorney is offended by statements such as "In the United
States, at least three distinct subcultures can be identified: the criminal society,
the military society, and the citizens' society--composed of those who do not fall
in the first two categories."" He would likewise be appalled at a remark such
as "A Military person is created during his initial training which emphasizes
depersonalization, isolation, and reorganization."'" One can't help thinking that
the author is merely trying to astound us with his scholarship and social insight.
When the author tells us that "in general civilian justice has been more
person-oriented than military justice," we wonder what he means, and why he
But when Mr. Ulmer
uses sophomoric phrases such as "person-oriented."'"
overcomes his self-conscious philosophizing, he demonstrates that he can write
an interesting narrative, sustained by historical insights. The growth and development of civilian and military law, and the right to counsel are carefully and ac5
curately chronicled. For readers not familiar with Miranda 4 and Tempia,' the
last few chapters of the book are likely to be particularly valuable.
The book contains some delightful things we might otherwise have forgotten,
such as the absurd quote from Wigmore:
The prime object of military organization is Victory, not Justice. The
Army's object is to kill, disable, or capture our enemy before he can kill or
capture us. In that death-struggle which is ever impending, the Army,
which defends the Nation, is strained by the terrific consciousness that the
Nation's life and its own is every moment at stake. No other objective than
Victory can have first place in its thoughts; there is never any remission of
good. But
that strain. If the Army can do Justice to its men, well and
G
Justice is always secondary; and Victory is always primary.'
7 Id. at 85.
8 id. at 4.
9 For an excellent article on the effective use of voir dire in the military, see Holdaway,
Voir Dire - A Neglected Tool of Advocacy, 40 MLITARY L. REV. 1 (1968).
10 Recently there has been an increasing interest in this field. For a further discussion of
trial in military courts, see H. ROTHBLATT, NEW SUCCESSFUL TECHNIQUES IN THE TRIAL OF
CRIMINAL CASES (1971).
11 S. ULMER, supra note 2, at

1.

12 Id. at 4.
13 I have criticized military justice elsewhere, especially in light of the possibility of command influence at all stages of trial proceedings. See generally Rothblatt, supra note 3.
14 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
15 U.S. v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629 (1967).
16 S. ULMER, supra note 2, at 28, citing Wigmore, Lessons from Military Justice, 4 J. Am.
JuD. Soc'Y 151 (1921).
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One delights in imagining Dean Wigmore explaining that to an 11-Bravo
carrying an M-79 in the Delta. The book is full of such nuggets.
One would not otherwise have known that prior to 1872 (and prior to the
1874 revision of the Articles of War) branding was practiced as a disciplinary
measure in the United States Army. The author tells us that "habitual drunkards
were branded 'HI),' mutineers 'M,' cowards 'C.' 'I' was used for insubordination
and 'W' for worthlessness."'" The thought of branding the buttocks of a worthless subordinate with a "W" is horrifying, but mildly engaging.
For those who wish a broad general historical introduction into the development of the right to counsel in both military and civilian courts, and a-study of the
relationship between military justice and public opinion, this book may have
considerable interest.
During the acknowledgements the author thanks the Institute on American
Freedoms for supporting his research. Perhaps much that is objectionable in the
book is the author's justification for the Institute's support. More than one
potentially fine book has been ruined by debts-real or imagined-to patrons. If
this review is harsh, it is because the book is fine in parts, and should have been
better throughout.
Henry B. Rothblatt*

THE ORGANIZATION OF JUDICIAL POWER IN THE UNITED STATES.

By Carl

McGowan. Chicago: Northwestern University Press. 1969. Pp. 133.
The Organization of Judicial Power in the United States is a scholarly examination of the dual judicial system of the United States. According to its
author, Judge Carl McGowan,' the book is a verbatim transcript of the Julius
Rosenthal Memorial Lectures that he delivered on three successive days at the
Northwestern School of Law in December, 1967.2
Appropriately the book starts with a brief, but pithy, historical analysis of
how the American dual judicial system came into being. Thereafter, Judge
McGowan discusses some of the problems that have caused friction between
federal and state courts. Finally, he explores and suggests ways to increase the
productivity of the judiciary in the United States and to improve the relationship
between federal and state courts.
In Part I, entitled "The Phenomenon of Dual Court Systems," Judge McGowan makes several interesting observations. As our generation has coincided
with a spectacular expansion of federal authority, it may come as a surprise to
some to learn that inferior federal courts were not given general federal question
jurisdiction until more than three-quarters of a century after they were first estab17 S. ULMER, supra note 2, at 36.
* Member, New York and California bars; LL.B., Brooklyn Law School, 1938; LL.M.,
Brooklyn Law School, 1939; Partner, Rothblatt & Rothblatt, New York City.
I The Honorable Carl McGowan is a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia.
2 C. McGowAN, THE ORGANIZATION OF JUDICIAL POWER IN THE UNITED STATES, v-Vi
(1969).
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lished.s Until 1875, the inferior federal courts, except for admirality, served "no
national purpose other than to provide a sanctuary for nonresident litigants from
local prejudice."4 It was not until after the Civil War, when national sentiment
was strong because of the successful suppression of the Confederacy, that
Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1875' which finally committed to those
courts power over "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority."'6 The 1875 Act was a critical decision for the future of
the federal courts because it provided the sinews by which those courts became
powerful instruments for centralizing and unifying national law.
Another interesting point made by Judge McGowan is that the United
States is the only nation in the world with a full system of inferior federal courts.
Several federal constitutions have authorized such courts, but only in the United
States has a parallel system of courts actually been established.
Finally, Judge McGowan depicts how the United States Supreme Court has
been greatly aided by the lower federal courts. The author concludes that it is
primarily because of this system that Supreme Court doctrines have been so
effectively carried out in the United States. The judge compares the United
States with Canada. Canada has a basic charter which authorizes the establishment of inferior courts, but it has never created these courts. The Supreme Court
of Canada is virtually an unknown body whose decisions have little or no finality
about them. The United States Supreme Court, of course, is neither unknown
nor ignored.
There has been substantial friction between federal and state courts. Generally speaking, this friction has occurred when federal courts have interpreted
the national Constitution and laws in such a way as to shrink the area in which
state law can function by expanding the area in which national law governs.7
Just how federal courts have acted to circumscribe state law and expand federal
law is the subject matter of Part II, "The Stresses of Coexistence."
The judge points out that federal courts have limited state action by propounding a federal common law; s by determining when Congress has intended
3 The lower federal courts are a creation of political compromise. At the time of the
Constitutional Convention the basic question was whether there should be one supreme court,
or a supreme court plus a system of inferior federal courts. After much debate and political
maneuvering, the framers of the Constitution compromised by leaving it to the legislative
branch to decide the question. (See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1). The law passed by the
First Congress was also a compromise measure. It did not give the lower federal courts the
full jurisdictional power described in article III of the Constitution. Judiciary Act of 1789, 1
Stat. 73. It entrusted the new courts with suits between citizens of different states, but withheld the general federal question jurisdiction set forth in article III, § 2 of the Constitution.
C. MCGOWAN, supra note 2, at 11-12, 18-29.
4 C. MCGOWAN, supra note 2, at 30.
5 18 Stat. 470.
6 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
7 It is the supremacy clause of the Constitution which enables the Constitution and
national law as interpreted by the federal courts to override any state law that may conflict
with them. U.S. CONST. art. VI, C1. 2.
8 C. McGowAN, supra note 2, at 44-46. Judge McGowan refers to federal common law
as "a corpus of federal non-statutory law determined by the federal courts without reference
to, and frequently in conflict with, the rules declared by state courts." He points out that
federal common law is rooted in conflict between some federal policy or interest and the rule of
state law that .would normally apply, and where such a conflict has been demonstrated, the
Supreme Court has not deferred to general state law. Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp.,
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to preempt states from acting in particular fields and interposing that as a bar to
state action; 9 by deciding when: personal rights guaranteed by the Constitution
have been abused in the trials of state criminal cases;" ° and by granting injunctions to halt impending state litigation when the federal courts believe such
litigation might have adverse effects on rights 4protected by the Constitution or
I
federal law. 1
The author also points out in Part II of his work that there have been occasions when the Supreme Court has endeavored to lessen the conflict and
tension between the two-sets of courts. One of the Oburt's most serious efforts
involved the concept of abstention. This doctrine was first articulated -for the
Court by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in 1941 in Railroad Commission v. Pullman
Co."z, The gist of this doctrine is that where a case involves both questions of
federal and state law, a district court should, in the interest of avoiding a clash
between state and federal authority, decline jurisdiction of the case until all
the issues of state law have been decided by the appropriate state court. Its
advantage is that difficult constitutional issues might never have to be decided
and the confusion inevitably attendant upon conflicting answers by state and
federal courts to concededly state issues could be avoided. Its disadvantage is the
interminable delay in the final disposition of lawsuits.
The Supreme Court's efforts to ease the tensions between federal and state
courts have not met with too much success." The doctrine of abstention still lives,
but barely. 4
It is the final part of Judge McGowan's book which is the most enjoyable.
The great problems of today, such as air and water pollution, mass transportation,
education, race relations, housing, and crime are imposing great strains upon our
existing institutions of government. The judiciary is no exception. Because of the
compelling problems of our time,"5 the workload of the judiciary-both state and
384 U.S. 63 (1966); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942); Dietrick v.
Greaney, 309 U.S. 190 (1940).
9 For example, by means of pre-emption, the Supreme Court has greatly limited the
capacity of state legislatures and courts to deal with problems in the field of labor relations.
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 ('1959); Textile Workers Union
of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
10 C. McGowAN, supra note 2, at 51. Judge McGowan states "[tlhe loudest discords have
sounded in the field of criminal law and procedure. This is not surprising .... [O]ne of the
important areas commonly accepted as being reserved to the states is the prosecution and punishment of crime."
11 Id. at 62-64. Judge McGowan notes that although the general equity powers of state
courts are essentially the same as those of lower federal courts, state courts have rarely attempted to interfere with federal proceedings. The Supreme Court has not seemed to encourage
the principle of reciprocity. Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964). However, Judge
McGowan believes there are instances when state courts should be able to enjoin federal proceedings.
12 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
13 See, e.g., Toucey v.N.Y. Life Ins. Co. 314 U.S. 118 (1941). Compare 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283 (1964); H.R. R.P. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A 181 (1948); and Dombrowski v.
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) with Toucey.
14 C. McGowAN, supra note 2, at 67-71. The Supreme Court appears to have written off
the doctrine of abstention, but there is still some interest in the principle. The Commissioners
on the Uniform State Laws have been working on a Uniform Certification of Questions of
Law Act and the legislatures of four states have acted to empower their courts to hear and
decide issues of state law certified to them by federal courts. The American Law Institute has
also shown interest in the principle.
15 Id. at 77-82. Judge McGowan states that the increase in litigation is due to many
causes such as tax deductions for litigation, the enhanced affluence of our society, -the increased
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federal-is overwhelming. Judge McGowan states in Part III, which is appropriately called "The Quest for Accommodation," that "all of our judicial resources
. . . are going to be needed to cope with rising tides of litigation. .. .,

To

Judge McGowan this means that clash and conflict between federal and state
courts must be minimized, that a rational distribution of the workload between
state and federal courts is essential, and that a number of improvements must be
made in the quality of the judiciary and their administrative procedures.
He believes that the jurisdiction between state and federal courts should
be re-examined and, basically, cases involving questions of state law should be
determined by state courts, and those involving federal question jurisdiction
should be decided by federal courts. The judge takes the position that the reason
for diversity, i.e., the danger of unfair preferment of local litigants over their outof-state opponents, has long ceased to exist. With respect to federal question
jurisdiction, he thinks that, at least for the present time, uniformity and expertness in the application of federal law seem more likely to accrue if those cases
are determined in the federal courts.
In the matter of the division of jurisdiction, the judge has adopted an approach suggested by the American Law Institute. 7 There has been little opposition to the view taken by the ALI in the federal question area. However, there
has been substantial opposition to the Institute's diversity proposals. The foes of
these proposals look upon federal courts as better places to try lawsuits than state
courts, and they do not want to be deprived of this. Judge McGowan's answer is:
An allocation which causes cases deriving from state law to be tried in state
courts is rational; the objection to it, that some state courts are not as good
as federal courts, is of a different order. The answer to the objection is not
to abandon reasoned jurisdictional principles but, by their very adoption, to
make such principles powerful engines for state judicial reform.'"
The author further recommends that there be more experimentation, on a
trial-and-error basis, in the judicial field. He mentions such things as trying
civil cases without juries; requiring less than unanimous verdicts in criminal
trials; and reducing the number of situations in which a litigant has the right to
appeal. He believes the state courts, because of their variety, offer a better opportunity for experimentation with new techniques than the federal system which
is much more uniform.
He further takes the view that some of our emerging problems can be better
handled by administrative bodies than by courts. For instance, he thinks problems
arising in connection with air and water pollution can probably be better handled
through an administrative agency with judicial power. According to Judge
McGowan:
availability of civil legal aid to the poor, the ever-widening scope of the provision for counsel
in criminal cases, and feeling by the public that they get quicker results through the judiciary
than by taking political action.
16 Id. at 87.
17 Judge McGowan's position is based on ALI STUDY OF THE DIvIsION OF JURISDICTION
BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 47-56 (Official Draft No. 1, 1965); and ALI STUDY
OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 57-65 (Tent. Draft

No. 5, 1967).
18 C. McGowAN, supra note 2, at 87.
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A common, or even statutory, law of nuisance applied in the courts is

arguably no substitute for an expert agency armed with investigative, rule
making, and adjudicative powers, and whose authority is unconstricted by

state, city, and county dividing lines.1 9

The author also recommends that the purely administrative framework of
judicial proceedings be modernized, and predicts this field will undergo great
changes in the next decade. The rising volume of cases taxes the record-keeping
and scheduling facilities of the courts, and will require the use of the newest
technologies for efficient handling. Judge McGowan considers this work of such
importance that it should be under the supervision of a responsible court administrator who approximates the judges in salary and prestige and who does
everything except decide cases.
This book is not a highly imaginative or creative one. For the most part, it
is an interesting and scholarly presentation of facts about the American dual
judiciary system that are relatively well known in legal circles. There are, however, certain things about the work that are particularly impressive. Anyone who
reads it must be impressed with this distinguished federal jurist's respect for and
understanding of state courts. His sensitive compassion for the junior partners of
the dual judiciary system whose powers have been limited and interfered with
through the years by the senior partners comes through most clearly.
Similarly, I think any reader must be impressed with the reasonable
feasibility of Judge McGowan's recommendations and suggestions to improve
the judiciary in the United States and the relationship between federal and state
courts. They have been most carefully considered and, on the whole, make extremely good sense. None of his suggestions are original in the sense that they
have never before been considered. What he has done is to review carefully
existing thinking, separate the wheat from the chaff, and come up with some
very practical and solid ways of improving the judiciary in the United States.
Furthermore, no one could read this book without being impressed with the
exhaustive research effort that made it possible. The text of the book is fully
documented through 178 footnotes. Its research value alone makes it well worth
possessing.
The book, though relatively short, is not easy or light reading. Many
complex and difficult thoughts and doctrines are concentrated in a relatively few
pages. However, it would be a shame if the reading audience for this book is
limited to the academic and legal communities. Hopefully, it will find its way into
the world of practical politics because it would be an extremely useful reference
for Congressmen, state legislators, and other decision-makers who have the responsibility for improving the organization and functioning of the dual judicial
system of the United States.
Samuel R. Pierce, Jr.*

19

Id. at 96.
General Counsel of the United States Treasury Department; Adjunct Professor of Law,
New York University School of Law; A.B., Cornell University, 1947; J.D., Cornell University,
1949; LL.M. in Taxation, New York University School of Law, 1952.
*
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By Germain

Grisez. Cleveland: Corpus Publications, 1970. Pp. 559. $15.00 cloth,
$6.95 paper.
In the first six months since the liberalized abortion law went into effect in
New York State on July 1, 1970, 69,000 children were killed by abortion in New
York City alone.- Even this estimate, however, is understated, since it does not
include abortions performed illegally or in doctors' offices. Comparable statistics,
on a smaller scale, could be advanced from other states that have relaxed their
abortion laws. Abortion, it is clear, is a big thing in the United States. Occasionally, too, we are reminded that it is a very real thing. Consider, for instance,
the fact that at least twenty-six babies have been "aborted alive" in New York,
emerging from the mother's womb, kicking, crying or otherwise striving for life,
only to linger briefly or longer and then die. One such baby, incidentally, survived the attempted killing and has since been placed for adoption.2
Too often, however, the realities of abortion are obscured in a fog of irrelevancies. The case for abortion is generally presented with elaborate statistics
on such things as the number of deaths from illegal abortions and with pretentious argumentation on the rights of the mother vis-4-vis the rights of her child
who is too often euphemistically described in less than fully human terms.

The abortion question in truth is quite simple.' It is essentially whether
the law should allow an innocent human being to be killed because his existence
is inconvenient or uncomfortable to others or because those others consider him
unfit to live. The critical fact is that the child in the womb is a human being.
From his conception he is alive. As the living offspring of human parents, what
else can he be but human? He is neither a dog nor a cat nor a turnip. If one
somehow doubts that the child in the womb is a living human being, one ought
to at least give him the benefit of the doubt.
Unfortunately, however, the defense of the innocent child in the womb
requires more than an affirmative statement of his reality and his rights. It
requires a rebuttal of the elaborate arguments contrived to legitimize his murder.
Until Germain Grisez, professor of philosophy at Georgetown University, wrote
this book, we had no such detailed rebuttal upon which we could rely. Others
have attempted such a rebuttal in lesser detail or on partial aspects of the
problem, but Professor Grisez has exhaustively analyzed the problem in all its
significant facets. For this reason alone his book would be significant. Beyond
this, however, he has done the job completely and carefully. Although few will
agree entirely with all of his conclusions, particularly in the area of public policy,
his book is reliable in its research and sound in its ethical orientation.
Grisez at the outset notes that his position is "an extremely liberal one'liberal' not in the sense of approving abortion but liberal in the sense of favoring
the freedom of the unborn to make their own choice about life and defending
1 New York Times, Feb. 7, 1971, at 70, col. 1.
2 TWIN CIRCLE, Jan. 17, 1971, at 1, col. 3.
3 For excellent analyses of the law and abortion, see Byrn, Abortion on Demand: Whose
Morality? 46 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 5 (1970); Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: The
Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46 NoTm DAME LAWYER 349 (1971).
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their right to live long enough to make that choice." 4 In, chapter one he describes
the process by which the life of a new individual begins at conception when the
sperm of the father unites with the egg of the mother. One useful feature of
Grisez's discussion of the biological process of reproduciion is his demonstration
of the untenability of viability or any other standard to determine the point at
which life begins and at which legal rights are acquired. Unless that point is
placed at conception the assignment of life and rights will be arbitrary.
Chapter two is devoted to a discussion of sociological considerations. After
noting the difficulty of making any reliable estimate of the number of illegal
abortions that are performed, Grisez sharply criticizes the tendency in some
quarters to portray the illegal abortionist as an altruist acting out of concern for
the anguished mother.' Money talks. And, says Grisez: "Probably most illegal
abortions are performed by physicians." 5 When we wonder what sort of women
have abortions, we might well reflect on Grisez's demonstration that abortion is
primarily a middle-class solution to the embarrassment of an illegitimate pregnancy or the bother of an unwanted though legitimate one. The number of
abortions is higher among married women, although the rate of abortions per
pregnancy is higher among single and formerly married women because they get
pregnant less frequently than married women. Grisez refutes the notion that
Negroes and very poor people are especially likely to get an abortion. He emphasizes instead that women tend to have abortions for the same reasons they practice
contraception. Sometimes abortion is an alternate method of birth control chosen
by those not using contraception. Also abortion is often used as a remedy for
contraceptive -failure. Professor Grisez also touches upon the racial implications
of contemporary abortion policy as applied to Negroes.'
In chapter three, Professor Grisez discusses the medical aspects of abortion.
One question involves the number of deaths" from- abortion. Of course, every
abortion results in death for the child, but the issue here is the number of mothers
who die from the procedure. This matter has been the subjdct of exaggeration,

with proponents of abortion contending that legalization is- the only way to
prevent the slaughter of thousands of mothers who are forced each year to commit
themselves to back-street abortionists. "Five thousand of these women die" each
year in the United States, intoned Walter Cronkite on CBS Reports.7 As Grisez
demonstrates, however, the total number of maternal deaths from abortion in the
United States falls somewhere between 200 and 400 each year.- Each death is
one too many. But we may legitimately inquire as to the magnitude of the
problem, since the number of maternal deaths from abortion is offered as the
justification for legalization. The figures advanced by the proponents of abortion
on this point are unreal. A similar unreality is found in the argument of those
who advocate liberalized abortion 'as th remedy for illegal abortions. If we
legalize abortion, so the argument goes, we will allow women to have their abortions in clean, safe surroundings and we will save them from the back-street
abortionist. Unfortunately for the proponents, the argument is unfounded in
4 G. GRISEZ,
5 Id. at 48.
6 Id. at 65.
7 Id. at 67.
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fact. As Grisez points out, despite the legalization of abortion, the "numbers of
'other abortions' have 'remained virtually constant' in Hungary, Czechoslovakia,
Poland, Bulgaria and Japan."' Legalization of abortion tends to generate an
abortion climate, in which abortion is viewed as a fail-safe contraceptive, and
there are always reasons, including the income-tax concerns of the aborting
physicians, which incline some women to avoid the legalized channels through
which they might legally kill their children. So illegal abortions continue despite
legalization. In this same chapter, Grisez also discusses the various techniques
of medical abortion and examines the oral contraceptives which are actually
abortifacients. He points out, too, that abortion is no remedy for psychiatric
illnesses or disturbances. Indeed it tends to aggravate psychiatric problems.
In chaper four, Professor Grisez summarizes the religious attitudes toward
abortion, including primitive religious, Vedic, Zoroastrian and Egyptian views
as well as Jewish, Catholic and Protestant approaches. He pointedly discusses the
variant Jewish views and finds traditional Jewish justification for viewing abortion as a form of murder.
With chapter five, we move into the legal questions. The author sets forth
the historical background underlying the status of abortion in Roman law, canon
law, civil law, Anglo-Saxon law and common law. He recites the development of
British statutory law on the subject from the first statute against abortion in 1803,
through the subsequent enactments of 1828, 1837, 1861 and the legalization
statute of 1967. He traces the development of statutes in other countries, with
emphasis on the Soviet Union's initial allowance of abortion, its prohibition of
abortion in 1936, and its relaxation of those prohibitions in 1955. There is a
good recital of the legal history of abortion in the United States, with a discussion
of the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, published in 1959, and the
subsequent relaxation of the law in various states beginning with the 1967 enactments in Colorado, California and North Carolina. He compares the American relaxation with the 1967 abortion legalization in the United Kingdom.
The Japanese experience with legalized abortion is then discussed, especially as
to the evidence that legalization has the effect of increasing the total number of
abortions while not reducing the number of illegal abortions.
Significantly, the author demonstrates that the abortion movement has
pushed beyond the initial quest for abortion only in limited cases. Rather, "most
who advocate relaxation of abortion laws are actually aiming at unlimited abortion-that is, they wish abortion to be regarded as any other elective surgery, to
be performed at the woman's request by any competent physician with no requirements about grounds, consultation, reporting, nor any other restrictive requirement." 9 Moreover, "A number of signs have appeared which indicate that
repeal of abortion laws would be quickly followed by the use of voluntary-and
perhaps even compulsory-abortion to fulfill the goals of public policies of population control and selection."' 0
In moving into a discussion of ethical arguments in chapter six, Grisez is
8
9
10

Id. at 47.
Id. at 257.
Id. at 261.
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quick to note the tendency of many toward relativism in this area and the incongruity of a relativist position:
I suspect that far fewer people would espouse a subjectivist and relativist attitude toward torture or murder than toward abortion. The number
that is confused on one matter or another undoubtedly varies depending
upon the extent to which the intuition of common sense reveals that an
act affects not only th6'agent himself but also another person who might be
seriously hurt by it. Thus we do not tend to say that torture or murder is
right for those who think them so, for we can imagine ourselves in the position of a victim who vigorously rejects any such "tolerant" judgment. If
we are less certain concerning abortion, this may be because we do not easily
put ourselves in the place of the fetus. Indeed, the question is raised whether
the aborted are human beings at all. To this question we must next turn our
attention.: 1
The book properly affirms the human character of the child in the womb
from the moment of his conception. Even if one somehow does not concede
that point, one ought at least to give the child the benefit of the doubt: "To be
willing to kill what for all we know could be a person is to be willing to kill it if it
is a person. And since we cannot absolutely settle if it is a person except by a
metaphysical postulate, for all practical purposes we must hold that to be willing
to kill the embryo is to be willing to kill a person* Consequently, we may not
evade moral responsibility for killing a person if we take responsibility for an
abortion."' 2 Grisez effectively criticizes the ethical approach to abortion of the
utilitarians, Kantians and Protestant situationists. He analyzes and suggests elaborations of the principle of the double effect and concludes that abortion is unethical even in cases of rape and incest. -Also, he properly condemns pills or other
means which are abortifacient at a very early stage of the pregnancy. "Everyone
who knows the facts and who prescribes or 13uses birth control methods that might
be abortifacient is an abortionist at heart."'
On the back cover of this book, the publisher calls particular attention to the
final chapter. In a practical sense, this chapter, entitled, "Toward a Sound Public
Policy," is the most important in the book. In it the author details his recommendations for the law. He argues that "the unborn" should be held to be legal
persons because they are human, alive and actually existing, thus satisfying the
three criteria for personhood indicated by the Supreme Court of the United States
in Levy v. Louisiana,a case involving illegitimate children:
We start from the premise that illegitimate children are not "nonpersons." They are humans, live and have their being. They are clearly
"persons" within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968)].1 4
Once the child in the womb is conceded to be a person, it follows that the
constitutional protections of due process of law and equal protection of the laws
11 Id. at 273.
12 Id. at 306.
13 Id. at 344.
14 Id. at 423.
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should apply to him.' However, this chapter is less satisfactory than the others
in its resolution of the contending claims of the mother and the child to the protection of the law. One issue is the allowance of abortion to preserve the life of
the mother, which Professor Grisez describes as a therapeutic abortion. Despite
his own ethical reservations, he concludes:
I think that a strictly limited therapeutic exception is not unjust. The
law cannot stand upon any theological or ethical theory justifying this exception, without illicitly establishing that theory as a common faith. But almost
all citizens, whatever their beliefs, agree that therapeutic abortion is justified
at times. Very few, whatever they believe with regard to the morality of the
act, would wish to have the law forbid abortion when without it both mother
and child would die. The question is how the therapeutic exception can be
legally justified. If we are not clear about its justification, the exception is
open to endless abuse and extension-which has, in fact, occurred in recent
years.:'
Grisez properly notes, however, that the common law of necessity would
not authorize the killing of another innocent person to save the life of the killer
and he concludes:
I think that what is needed in this matter is a more careful reconsideration of the entire question of excusable homicide, not merely the problem
involving the unborn. When life is at stake, is it just to excuse an act which
destroys another innocent life? Bearing in mind the fact that law cannot
require all that is morally demanded and cannot enforce any single moral
theory, I think we must admit that the law could justly excuse homicide in
certain conditions.' 7
Since "life is at stake in any case" in these situations, Grisez relies upon the
general consensus to set the limits of the law's restraint, in that "the common
judgment may be accepted as the appropriate criterion of what life is to be saved
and what sacrificed."' 8
To make the legality of abortion, or of any other killing of the innocent,
depend on consensus is perilous and essentially unsound. The danger is that the
pressures of consensus, acting on a misdirected pluralism, will cause the allowance
to be extended. Grisez, for example, goes beyond his legal acceptance of abortion
to save the life of the mother and further accepts abortion where the child is
conceived as a result of rape, because "a legal system such as ours must establish
a rule of resolution not on the basis of any single moral or religious theory but on
the general consensus of reasonable people."
He would allow medical treatment of victims of forcible rape beyond the point where that treatment is limited
to the prevention of pregnancy: "If such treatment involved procedures which
might possibly be abortifacient but were not certainly so, this possibility might
justly be admitted by the law, whatever its moral justifiability." 20 This latter
15
16
17
18
19
20
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position appears to conflict with his view, expressed in the same chapter, that a
license should be denied for the production and distribution of the intra-uterine
device because "the existing evidence indicates a large possibility, even a probability, that this technjue is abortifacient." And, continues Grisez, "I do not see
legal justification"for permitting the use of the IUD, because' the risk that human
beings are killed by it is high and there is no overwhelming need to accept that
risk.,,21

Whether the law should allow abortion to save the life of the mother is a
debatable point. This reviewer personally does not believe that the law should
allow abortion even there. For one thing,, abortions are medically no longer
necessary to save the life of the mother 'in the sense inwhich those statutes use
the term. Instead, the allowance here is used as a loophole by many who find
it easy to have an obliging psychiatrist declare that if the mother does not have
an abortion she will commit suicide. Second, the common law doctrine of necessity seems correct when it forbids the killing of an 'innocent person to save 'the
life of the killer. But it must be conceded that the issue is debatable because of
the parity of values involved. when it is one lf6 for another. That parity, however, is absent when the' abortion is sought for any lesser reason than the mother's
life. This applies to abortion to avoid injury to her physical or mental health
where her life is not at stake, and it applies to the rape situation as well as where
the mother simply decides not to have the child. In all these cases, we may
properly call the result killing for convenience.
Having yielded to the notion of consensus as the determinant of law in this
area of life and death, Professor Grisez is unconvincing in his efforts to limit the
exceptions he would allow. For example, he would' require a court hearing before
allowing the abortion for rape or for what he calls "a strictly limited therapeutic exception.""2 In the first place, there is a disturbing contrast between his
rejection of capital punishment for convicted murderers regardless of the court
hearings involved 3 and his tolerance of capital punishment for innocent children
in limited cases provided only that a court hearing be held. One can consistently
be for capital punishment and against abortion-the victim of capital punishment
is culpable and has forfeited his right to live according to principles analogous
to those of self-defense while the child in the womb is innocent. But one cannot
consistently be against capital punishment and for abortion.
There is difficulty, too, with Grisez's standard for his "limited therapeutic
abortions." He says:
If the unborn individual is accepted as a legal person, then abortion could
never be justified or justifiably excused in those cases (which constitute
almost all) in which the very purpose of the operation is to 'get rid of the
child. Any abortion that could be justifiably excused would have to be one
in which what is unbearable is the state of pregnancy itself, not the child to
be borne. This condition is fulfilled only in those cases in which the child
in the womb would be cared for and raised if an artificial uterus were
available. Some cases in which the mother's health is affected by pregnancy,
21 Id. at 428.
22 Id. at 431.
23

See id. at 323 et seq.
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as well as cases involving her life,
24 and conceptions resulting from forcible
rape might meet this condition.
He does not say that every case meeting this standard should warrant an abortion and he is particularly wary of the concept of "health" as a justification, since
it could be stretched very far. But in fact Grisez has opened a door he is not
going to be able to dose, whatever the intensity of his own moral opposition to
abortion.
Professor Grisez ably refutes the arguments that laws forbidding abortion
are an infringement on the constitutional rights of the mother or that they
violate the first amendment's prohibition against laws respecting an establishment
of religion. In an excellent passage, he refutes the notion advanced by Congressman Father Robert F. Drinan, S.J., that the criminal law should withdraw from
the area.25 Finally, the chapter on public policy offers concrete and constructive
suggestions for a "strategy in defense of life." He rejects the promotion of contraception as an alternative to abortion although he would not have the law
restrain the distribution and sale of contraceptives. He would oppose the licensing
of abortifacient drugs because, "Whatever abortions in early pregnancy are
deemed legal can be performed easily enough by mechanical methods-the
curette or a vacuum apparatus."2 He urges increased efforts to obtain a decision
from the Supreme Court of the United States "squarely facing the issue whether
the unborn are to be regarded as persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 2 He urges the organization of pressure groups against abortion.
He opposes the tendency of opponents of abortion to accept a "compromise"
when total relaxation is urged. Too often " 'compromise' is merely another name
for complete surrender."2 In his epilogue, Grisez asserts that "the essential point"
of the drive for abortion "is a deep-seated prejudice against unborn babies." He
coins the term "prenatalism" to describe this prejudice.
It is not incidental to mention that this book has an exhaustive and competently detailed index.
Sometimes a book reviewer will say complimentary things about a book and
then proceed to criticize and disparage it relentlessly. Sometimes a reviewer
will dredge up captious criticisms just to show he is not uncritical in his praise. It
is my hope to avoid both of these pitfalls. This is truly a useful and excellent
book. My reservations about a few of the public policy recommendations are substantial. But the recommendations discussed critically here are not really central
to the prime utility of the book which is a sourcebook of facts and argument. It
is a mine of soundly penetrating ethical analysis. And it is literally indispensable
to anyone in the legal profession who proposes to do anything in a serious way to
stop the legal killing of innocent babies.
Charles E. Rice*
24
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* Acting Associate Dean, University of Notre Dame Law School; Member, State Bar of
New York; A.B., Holy Cross College, 1953; LL.B., Boston College, 1956; LL.M., New York
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Edited by William G. Andrews. New York: Van Nostrand
Reinhold Co. 1969.

DENT.

In this unique volume in the New Perspective Series, the editor has reproduced several of the most notable addresses and public papers emanating from
American constitutional development. All of them occurred in or arose out of
times of national stress or constitutional crisis. Each of them involved constitutional interpretation.
In both selection and arrangement, the editor has sought to show that,
although the interpretation of the Constitfition is a chief judicial function, the
legislative and executive branches of the government, in the regular exercise of
their constitutional powers, necessarily interpret the Constitution, and unless we
take into consideration their non-judicial interpretations and applications of
constitutional provisions and doctrines we do not have the total correct perspective of constitutional interpretation.
Support for this postulate is found in each of the first three of the four
divisions of the material reproduced. The first part contains selections from the
debates in Congress in February, 1802, on the repeal of the Judiciary Act of
1801' The political purpose of repeal was to eliminate Federalist judges which
the Act had provided for and whom Adams had appointed on the eve of leaving
the presidency. The debate, however, transcended political expediency and
expanded to a profound Congressional consideration of the power of judicial
review, including the right of the Supreme Court to declare invalid legislative acts
repugnant to the Constitution. It is not claimed that this doctrine of judicial
supremacy originated in these debates. It did not. But it is significant that in the
evolution of this paramount constitutional doctrine, members of Congress, in
bitter debate, championed it a year before it was confirmed by Chief Justice John
Marshall's celebrated opinion in Marbury v. Madison.'
The papers in the second part reveal how in Congressional practice powers
of Congress extending far beyond those expressly given by the Constitution have
been discovered and applied. Here are set forth those debates out of which the
doctrine of implied powers emerged. Only later was the doctrine confirmed by
the Supreme Court. Here are the debates in Congress, prolonged through more
than a century, from the addresses of Lincoln and Douglas as candidates for the
Senate of the United States in 1858 to the debates in Congress on the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,2 tracing the rise of the American Negro from a status of
property and slavery to citizenship and freedom under the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.' Here also are selections from Congressional debates
on the constitutionality of the historic Sherman Anti-trust Act,' the Bituminous
Coal Act6 and a defense of the NRA by President Franklin D. Roosevelt at one
of his frequent press conferences. History stalks boldly across these pages record1 Oh. 4, 2 Stat. 89.
2
3
4
5
6

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) ; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975(a) et seq. (1964).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, ,§ 1.
15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1964).
Oh. 127, 50 Stat. 72.
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ing Congressional action before, after and without judicial interpretation of the
Constitution.
Among the reproduced papers in the third part are those pertaining to the
powers of the President not specifically set forth in the Constitution or judicially
declared. Included first are those pertaining to the right of removal as debated
in the First Congress by James Madison, then a member of the House, and
Representative Michael J. Stone of Maryland. These were defended by President
Andrew Jackson in his famous protest message following his censure by the Senate
for removing William J. Duane as his Secretary of the Treasury. They were
likewise defended -by President Andrew Johnson in his message accompanying
his veto of the Tenure of Office Act in 1867.' As the editor explains, the power
of the President to remove appointees from office was exercised by Presidents for
a period of more than 135 years before there was a judicial interpretation of the
constitutional provisions governing such power in Myers v. United States'
The third part also contains a bitter address made in the Senate against the
power of Lincoln to issue the Emancipation Proclamation, other addresses challenging the exercise by the President of other war and diplomatic powers, and two
addresses in the Senate of the Eighty-second Congress, one supporting and one
opposing the steel seizure by the President.
In the fourth and final part of the volume the editor reviews some of the
relatively recent decisions of the Supreme Court, including the Palko, Gideon 0
and Miranda" cases in which individual procedural rights have been reemphasized through a more rigid application of the provisions of the Bill of Rights.
Finally, there is a reproduction of arguments in unsuccessful attempts to circumvent the effect of these decisions by constitutional amendment.
In reproducing these papers with brief accounts of their relations with the
history of the times and their effect upon constitutional development the editor
has supplied an avenue of approach to a complete understanding of constitutional
interpretation that may be easily and unwittingly neglected. The volume illustrates the pertinency of comment made by Chief Justice Burger during the meeting of the American Bar Association in Dallas in 1969, to the effect that in our
law schools students learn law confined primarily to cases decided by appellate
courts. If students of constitutional law and lawyers whose practice involves constitutional questions have limited their knowledge of constitutional interpretation
to reports of judicially determined cases without a consideration of the facts and
the papers set forth in this volume, much of what they should be familiar with will
have escaped them.
Rush H. Limbaugh*

7 Ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430.
8 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
9 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
10 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
11 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
* Member, Missouri Bar; A.B., University of Missouri, 1915; Legal Education, University
of Missouri School of Law. Mr. Limbaugh is a member of the firm of Limbaugh, Limbaugh,
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a brief summary for quick reference. Los Angeles: Parker & Sons Publications, Inc. 1970. Pp. 71. $6.30.
MAN'S DOMION: THE STORY OF CONSERVATION IN AMERICA. By Frank
Graham, Jr. The author of Since Silent Spring takes the reader on a stirring
trip through the history of conservation, from the late 19th century to the
present. Special attention is given to the giants of conservation; such as
John Muir and Gifford Pinchot. New York: M' Evans and Co., Inc. 1971.
Pp. xii, 318. $8.95.
PENNSYLVANIA. By Ralph Adam Fine. The narration of
a hypothetical case in which the Supreme Court is asked to declare unconstitutional the laws prohibiting possessioi and use of marijuana. The arguments are based on actual legal discussions and scientific studies. New York:
McCall Publishing Co. 1970. Pp. 154. $4.95.

MARY JANE VERSUS

MASTERING THE DRAFT.

By'Andiew 0. Shapiro and John Striker. A detailed,

impartial study of draft laws, designed to be used as a reference source for
'any questions concerning the draft. Boston:- Little, Brown and Company.
1970. Pp. xxii, 626. $15.00.
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A HANDBOOK FOR THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS. By Edward
M. Byrne. The author discusses the military member's intimate involvement with the law under which he lives and focuses on the affirmative duties
(including 'police') not found in the civilian environment. Written as a
handbook for military personnel in general, and not military lawyers. Annapolis, Md.: United States Naval Institute 1970. Pp. xix, 396. $7.50.

MILITARY LAw:

By Edward W. Fordham. The author presents
selected cross-examinations with a minimum of comment, indicating briefly
only what matters are at issue. Does not contain an evaluation of the crossexaminations reprinted. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1970 (reprint
of 1951 edition). Pp. xxii, 202. $9.75.

NOTABLE CROSS-EXAMINATIONS.

THE OPEN CONSPIRACY: WHAT AMERICA'S ANGRY GENERATION IS

SAYING.

By

Ethel Grodzins Romm. Views on, and generous selection from, America's
underground press, dealing, of course, with their rollicking and rowdy topics.
Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books. 1970. Pp. 251. $6.95.
By Garn Webb and Thomas Bianco.
Holt/Landmark Law Summaries. An outline-type reference handbook
offering a quick summary of the law of personal property and bailments.
New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc. 1970. Pp. 145. (Price unreported) (paperbound).

PERSONAL PROPERTY AND BAILMENTS.

By Philip B. Kurland.
While he contends that the Warren Court created no major doctrines, the
author argues that it has become a political target because of a coercive,
rather than a persuasive, method of centralizing power in the national government. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1970. Pp. xxv, 206.
$9.75.

POLITIcS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE WARREN COURT.

ACT. By Commerce Clearing
House. The historically favored private foundations found 20% of the Tax
Reform Act devoted to themselves. In this volume, the CCH editors explain
the new restrictions, new taxes and new concepts which the new Act created.
Chicago: Commerce Clearing House, Inc. 1970. Pp. 145. $4.00.

THE PRIVATE FOUNDATION AND THE TAX REFORM

By D. T. B. North and G. L.
Buckingham. The authors examine the human and economic issues of a
wage agreement and the ways of designing and implementing a productivity
agreement to achieve the goals involved in the wage bargaining. Boston:
Cahners Book Division. 1970. Pp. 254. $13.50.

PRODUCTIVITY AGREEMENTS AND WAGE SYSTEMS.

Edited by Boris I.
Bittker. A collection of articles previously published in various law reviews
and professional journals, all discussing the ethical problems raised by the
practice of tax law. Branford, Conn.: Federal Tax Press, Inc. 1970.
Pp. 476. (Price unreported).

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE.
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BOOKS RECEIVED

QB VII. By Leon Uris. The noted novelist moves into Queen's Bench Courtroom Number Seven in London where he observes a fictional trial of a bestselling American author who allegedly defamed a knighted doctor in his
latest novel. New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc. 1970. Pp. 504. $7.95.
IN FEDERAL TAXATION. By Frank E. Sander and David Westfall. A
collection of law review articles, commission reports and government documents selected to give the reader insights into the problems arising from our
tax laws. Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, Inc. 1970. Pp. 650. $5.50
(paperbound).

READINGS

By Carroll Dunscombe. A survey of some of
the legal problems involved in residential and commercial uses along the
water's edge in relation to the substantive aspects of public policy. New
York: The William-Frederick Press. 1970. Pp. 82. $3.00 (paperbound).

RIPARIAN AND LITTORAL RIGHTS.

A

PRIMER. By Earl W. Kintner. The author gives a brief
historical survey, and follows with an excellent treatment of the existing laws
dealing with price discrimination. New York: Macmillan. 1970. Pp. vii,
389. (Price unreported).

ROBINSON-PATMAN

SrruATIONmsM AND THE NEw MORALrTY. Edited by Robert L. Cunningham.
The editor offers a general philosophical perspective, and follows with
selected essays examining the theme, as stated in the title. New York: Apple-

ton-Century-Crofts. 1970. Pp. 281. $3.50 (paperbound).
ELECTORAL PROCESS. By Richard Claude. A
comprehensive study of the ways in which the Supreme Court has gradually

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE

nationalized the electoral process, from the days of Chief Justice Waite to
those of Chief Justice Warren. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1970.
Pp. xv, 281. $10.00.
THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW,

1970. Edited by Philip B. Kurland. Five essays,

one dealing generally with the Burger Court, and others treating church
taxation, freedom of the press, the welfare prior hearing cases, and labor
injunctions. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1970. Pp. 268.

$12.95.
TAX

COURT PRACTICE. By Loyal E. Keir and Douglas W. Argue. A practice
handbook which discusses organization and jurisdiction, choice of forum,

pleadings and procedure, and offers sample forms. Reflects changes of the
1969 Tax Reform Act. Philadelphia: ALI-ABA Joint Committee on Continuing Legal Education. 1970. (4th ed.). Pp. x, 144. (Price unreported)
(paperbound).
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REFORM ACT OF 1969. By Commerce Clearing House. The full text of the
Act together with the law as it was before the Act. Chicago: Commerce
Clearing House, Inc. 1969. Pp. 348. $4.00.

OF INTERSTATE BUSINESS. A Tax Foundation Seminar discussing the
problems of interstate taxation through sales and use taxes and income taxes.
New York: Tax Foundation, Inc. 1970. Pp. 100. $5.00.

TAXATION

TIuAL. By Tom Hayden. A personal analysis of the Chicago Conspiracy Trial.
The view taken is one of disgust with the system, revolt at the accepted
judicial procedures and protections, and objection to the "system's" suppression of dissent. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc. 1970.
Pp. 166. $4.95 cloth, $1.95 paper.
OF NOISE. By Robert A. Baron. The author presents a devastating picture of the effects of noise pollution, showing why noise abatement is
necessary, and concludes with a positive program for effective noise control.
New York: St. Martin's Press. 1970. Pp. 276. $7.50.

THE TYRANNY

By Garn Webb and Thomas Bianco.
Holt/Landmark Law Summaries. An outline-type reference handbook
offering a quick summary of Wills and Estate Administration. New York:
Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc. 1970. Pp. 83. (Price unreported) (paperbound).

WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES.

